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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Of The Case

Nature

Jermaine James Arrats appeals from the

Arrats’s petition for post-conviction relief with prejudice.

court erred

by dismissing

judgment dismissing

district court’s

Arrats argues that the district

the petition Without judicially noticing transcripts

underlying criminal case and abused

its

discretion

by dismissing

from Arrats’s

the petition Without

appointing counsel.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

This post-conviction proceeding arises from Jermaine James Arrats’s conviction

According

for robbery. (R., p.4.)

to

remove

that

he

[the Victim]

“by using force or Violence

from the vehicle.” (No. 45030 R., pp.45-46. 1) Arrats did not dispute

stole the Victim’s car

psychosis” that caused
to escape” 0r

t0 the state, Arrats stole a car

him

by

“force[]” but

blamed

t0 believe that “people

his behavior

(spelling ﬁxed).) Arrats drove the stolen car “well in excess 0f 120

45030 PSI,

full

had kidnapped [him] and

he “was going to be captured and then murdered.”

in a residential neighborhood. (N0.

0n “a

blown meth
that [he]

had

(N0. 45030 PSI, p.5

mph” before

crashing

p.4.)

Arrats and the state entered a Rule 11 binding plea agreement that called for an

aggregate sentence 0f thirty years, With ten years ﬁxed and twenty years indeterminate.
(No. 45030 R., pp.81-83.)

1

The

district court

As

part 0f the agreement, the parties stipulated that, rather than

took judicial of the following documents from Arrats’s underlying

criminal proceeding, Which

was designated Case No. 45030 0n

appeal: “the information

charging Arrats With robbery; the Rule 11(f)(1)(C) plea agreement; the presentence report;
the judgment 0f conviction; the order appointing the SAPD; Arrats’s Rule 35 motion and

motion for appointment of counsel; the order denying those motions; the four
notices of appeal; and the opinion ofthe Idaho Court oprpeals 0n appeal.” (R., p.17 n. 1 .)
related

1

by admitting he committed

enter a guilty plea

pursuant to North Carolina

V.

the robbery, Arrats could enter a plea

Alford, 394 U.S. 956 (1 969),

prove the elements 0f robbery

at trial.

by agreeing

that the state could

(N0. 45030 R., p.82.) The district court accepted

the binding plea agreement and sentenced Arrats accordingly. (No.

45030

R., pp.97-100.)

Arrats ﬁled a Rule 35 motion alleging that the district court imposed an illegal

(N0. 45030 R., pp.120-26.)

sentence because he acted in self—defense under Idaho law.

The

district court

conviction.

denied Arrats’s motion as an improper collateral attack on his underlying

court’s denial ofArrats’s Rule 35

V. Arrats,

The Idaho Court of Appeals afﬁrmed

(No. 45030 R., p.132.)

N0. 45030, 2017

motion 0n the basis articulated by the

the district court violated his right t0 due process

defense and that his “counsel during

[t]rial”

relief.

and

(R., pp.4-8.)

He

also alleged “[t]hat the District

refused t0 appoint counsel to assist [him] during the Rule 35 process”

that Arrats told

One week

later,

him to

raise.

all

by

failing to raise the issues

(R., pp.5-6.)

the district court ﬁled notice that

petition for post-conviction relief.

defendant waives

self-

provided ineffective assistance by refusing t0

that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance

0n appeal

m

Arrats alleged that

by refusing t0 follow Idaho’s law 0n

present Arrats’s evidence of self—defense. (R., pp.5-6.)

it

district court.

WL 5562527 (Idaho Ct. App. NOV. 20, 2017).

Arrats ﬁled a petition for post-conviction

Court erred When

the district

(R., pp.16-25.)

non-jurisdictional defects

it

The

and defenses

intended t0 dismiss Arrats’s

district court

observed that a

t0 a criminal charge

When the

defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, and found that “Arrats

waived the defense of self—defense” because “Arrats present[ed] n0 reason
Alford plea wasn’t entered voluntarily and understandingly.”

(R., p.

1

9.)

t0 think his

The district court also informed Arrats that it was going to dismiss his claim that
his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to present Arrats’s evidence of self-defense
because Arrats did not plead facts “sufficient to satisfy either element of the Strickland
test.” (R., p.20.) Specifically, the district court found Arrats had failed to plead deficient
performance because his defense attorney never had the opportunity to present evidence of
self-defense given that Arrats pled guilty and because the facts of the underlying crime,
even as articulated by Arrats, “aren’t enough to make out the defense of self-defense.” (R.,
pp.20-21.) The lack of any alleged facts supporting self-defense also meant that Arrats had
failed to plead prejudice. (R., p.21.)
The district court also informed Arrats that it was going to dismiss his claims related
to his Rule 35 motion. The district court explained that Arrats’s claims that the district
court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion and erred when it refused to appoint counsel
for Arrats were procedurally barred because Arrats litigated those issues, or at least could
have litigated those issues, on direct appeal. (R., pp.21-22.) Arrats’s claim that his
appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance would be dismissed, the district court
explained, because appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal and
all of the issues Arrats claimed his counsel should have raised were meritless. (R., p.23.)
The district court also preliminarily denied Arrats’s motion for the appointment of
post-conviction counsel because Arrats had failed to “allege[] facts that raise the possibility
of a valid claim.” (R., p.24.) The notice informed Arrats that he had thirty days to respond
to the notice and supplement his claims or the district court would dismiss Arrats’s petition
without appointing counsel. (R., p.24.)

3

More than thirty days later, Arrats filed his reply to the district court’s notice of
intent to dismiss. (R., pp.26-32.) The district court accepted Arrats’s petition as timely
despite his late filing (R., p.33.) But the district court found that “Arrats fail[ed] to
demonstrate any flaw in the Court’s analysis” and dismissed Arrats’s claims “for the
reasons articulated in the notice of intent to dismiss.” (R., pp.33, 36.)
Arrats timely appealed. (R., pp.43-46.)

4

ISSUES
Arrats states the issues

1.

Did the
Arrats

on appeal

as:

district court error [sic] in

sua sponte summarily dismissing Mr.

[sic] petition for post-conviction reliefwithout judicially noticing

the record?

Did

[2].

the district court abuse

its

discretion

by dismissing

the petition for

post-conviction relief without appointing counsel?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Arrats

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

when

it

dismissed Arrats’s petition Without judicially noticing the transcripts ofArrats’s
underlying criminal proceeding?

II.

Has Arrats

failed to

show

that the district court

dismissing his petition Without appointing counsel?

abused

its

discretion

by

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

Its

Discretion

Judiciallv Noticing Transcripts

A.

BV Dismissing Arrats’s

Petition

Without

From The Underlying Criminal Proceeding

Introduction

The

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

when

it

dismissed Arrats’s petition

Without taking judicial notice 0f the transcripts from his underlying criminal proceeding.

The

noticed

district court judicially

all

of the records from the underlying criminal

proceeding that were necessary to decide that Arrats’s petition did not raise the possibility

of a Viable post-conviction claim.

Under

the rule governing judicial notice, the district

court could not have had an obligation t0 take judicial notice of the transcripts because n0

party requested the district court take judicial notice.
Arrats argues that the state had a statutory obligation to respond to his petition and

attach the transcripts to

district court

could

its

response. But the state did not need to respond here because the

make an

intelligent decision

0n Arrats’s

petition Without a response.

Furthermore, the state could not have had an obligation to provide the transcripts from the

underlying criminal proceeding because the transcripts were not material to the issues
Arrats raised in his petition.

transcripts, Arrats

he made no

B.

if the state

had an obligation

t0 provide the

cannot beneﬁt from the state’s failure t0 provide the transcripts because

effort to

Standard

And even

compel the production of the

transcripts in the district court.

Of Review

Arrats characterizes the issue 0n appeal as whether the district court erred

dismissed his petition “without judicially noticing the record.”

When

it

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

This Court reviews issues ofjudicial notice for an abuse of discretion.

Rome V.

State,

164

Idaho 407,

_, 431 P.3d 242, 248 (2018).

Despite that articulation of the issue presented,

Arrats actually faults the state for not presenting the district court with the transcripts from
Arrats’s criminal case as was, in Arrats’s View, a statutory requirement. (Appellant’s brief,

pp.6-8.)

“This Court exercises free review over the interpretation of a statute.” State

V.

Tollman, 162 Idaho 798, 801, 405 P.3d 583, 586 (2017).

The

C.

District

Transcripts

The

Court Did Not Have

From

district court

Arrats’s criminal case.

I.R.E. 201.

The

had n0 obligation

Judicial notice

is

I.R.E. 201(c)(1) (emphasis added).

is

Obligation

when

T0 Take

t0 take judicial notice

Judicial Notice

Of The

“a party requests

“may

district court

take judicial notice on

its

E

own” but

must take judicial notice 0n its own.

The only time a
it

of the transcripts from

governed by the Idaho Rules 0f Evidence.

rule states that the district court

does not impose any requirement that the

notice”

An

Arrats’s Criminal Case Before Dismissing His Petition

and the court

district court

is

“must take judicial

supplied with the necessary

information.” I.R.E. 201(c)(2) (emphasis added). Here, n0 party requested that the district
court take judicial notice of any record in Arrats’s criminal case. Without such a request,
the district court could not have

had an obligation

including transcripts, in Arrats’s criminal case.

E

to take judicial notice

of any record,

I.R.E. 201(0).

Arrats argues that the state had a statutory obligation to present the transcripts from
Arrats’s criminal case to the district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)

governing pleadings in post-conviction actions, Which requires the
post-conviction reliefhas been ﬁled, to “respond

its

He

cites the statute

state, after

a petition for

by answer 0r by motion” and to “ﬁle with

answer the record [0f the proceedings challenged] or portions thereof that are material

t0 the questions raised in the application.”

statute is misplaced.

LC.

§ 19-4906(a).

Arrats’s reliance

0n the

Although the

statute

imposes 0n the

state

an obligation t0 ﬁle a response t0 a

petition for post-conviction relief, a district court can dismiss a petition Without a response

from the

state

Where the record allows the

district court t0

the application despite the State’s failure to respond.”

“make an

intelligent ruling

Fetterly V. State, 121 Idaho 417,

418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991) (quotations omitted). Here, the district court, 0n

initiative,

case,

“reviewed the petition for post-conViction

and the case ﬁle

relief, the rest

in the underlying criminal case”

0n

its

0f the record in

own
this

and then took judicial notice of the

material documents from the underlying criminal case.

(R., p.24;

ﬂ

R., p.17 n.1,)

The

record was thus sufﬁcient t0 allow the district court to “make an intelligent ruling on the
application.” FLterly, 121 Idaho at 418, 825 P.2d at 1074.2

Furthermore, the state had n0 obligation t0 provide the transcripts because the
transcripts

were not “material

to the questions raised in the application.”

Arrats’s claims for post-conviction relief are

0f self—defense.3
defense.

is

At best,

(R., pp.4-7.)

all

LC.

§ 19-4906(a).

based on his View that he had a valid claim

But none 0f the

transcripts

mention anything about

self-

the transcripts provide the factual basis of the crime, but that information

already available in the records the district court judicially noticed.

(E, gg, No. 45030

PSI.)

2

Although the record is not clear as t0 Why the state did not respond t0 Arrats’s petition,
Viewed the district court’s ﬁling of the notice of intent to dismiss, just
one week after Arrats ﬁled his petition, as an indication that the district court did not need
a response “to properly frame any factual and legal issues before the district court so that
it [could] make an intelligent ruling.” Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 418, 825 P.2d at 1074.

the state could have

3

Arrats’s claims either expressly mention self—defense or relate t0 his Rule 35 motion. (R.,

pp.5-6.) His Rule 35 motion, in turn, argued only that the district court

imposed an illegal
(No. 45030 R.,

or overly harsh sentence because he had a valid claim 0f self—defense.
pp. 120-26.)

Arrats argues that “the transcripts of the change of plea hearing and sentencing

hearings were necessary t0 resolution

[sic]

of Mr. Arrats’ claims” because he “challenged

the voluntariness of his Alford plea and his the [sic] effectiveness of his attorney’s

But

assistance during plea proceedings.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

characterization ofArrats’s claims.

present[ed]

n0 reason

t0

understandingly.” (R., p. 1 9.)

Em

think

his

And his

Part

II.

that is not

an accurate

As the district court observed,

Alford plea

wasn’t

entered

“Arrats

voluntarily

and

only claim with respect to the ineffective assistance

0f counsel during plea negotiations was that his attorney “refused t0 present [Arrats’s]
evidence 0f self defense [sic]” (R., p.6), Which ﬁnds n0 support in the transcripts and, even
if true,

has no bearing on whether Arrats entered his plea voluntarily.

Even
from the

if the transcripts

state’s failure to

were material

provide the transcripts because Arrats

transcription,” a petitioner

must

Roman V.

App. 1994). Arrats made n0

and thus cannot beneﬁt from the

attempt t0 secure

with “the consequence of failing t0 place in evidence

makes an “effort t0 compel action by the

for the ﬁling ofthe transcript.”

n.3 (Ct.

live

made n0

now beneﬁt

Despite “the state[‘s] responsibility to pay for the

the transcripts in the district court.

a transcript” unless he

t0 Arrats’s claims, Arrats cannot

State,

state 0r to

otherwise arrange

125 Idaho 644, 648 n.3, 873 P.2d 898, 902

effort to put the transcripts in front

state’s failure t0 present

them

ofthe

district court

t0 the district court.

II.

Arrats

Has Failed T0 Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Discretion

BV Dismissing

Arrats’s Petition Without Appointing Counsel

A.

Introduction

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Arrats’ s petition without
appointing counsel for Arrats.

A

district court

need only appoint counsel for a post-

conviction petitioner if he alleges facts in his petition that

show

the possibility 0f a valid

claim. Here, the district court explained t0 Arrats in a thorough notice of intent t0 dismiss

Why

exactly

he had failed t0 raise even the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim.

Arrats’s reply did not

ﬁx the

issues noted

by the

district court, so the district court

properly

denied Arrats’s motion t0 appoint counsel and then dismissed Arrats’s petition.

On

appeal, Arrats does not take issue With the district court’s conclusion that the

asserted claims in the petition do not raise the possibility of relief. Instead, Arrats argues

that the district court applied the

wrong

standard, did not provide sufﬁcient notice, and

should not have dismissed the petition because transcripts outside of the record contained
facts that raised the possibility

is

wrong: The

whether

district court

of two un-asserted claims for post-conviction

relief.

Arrats

expressly stated and applied the correct standard for deciding

to appoint counsel for Arrats.

The

district court

explained the reasons

Why

Arrats’s post-conviction claims did not merit the appointment 0f counsel, as required

the relevant statute.

were not
that

B.

And the district court had n0

in the record to determine

would show

Standard

by

obligation to slog through transcripts that

Whether Arrats could have alleged

facts in his petition

the possibility of a valid claim.

Of Review

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a
or deny counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.

E

district court’s decision t0

Workman

V. State,

appoint

144 Idaho 5 18,

529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007).

C.

The

District

Court Properly Dismissed The Petition Without Appointing Counsel

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Arrats’ s petition Without
appointing counsel. “[T]he proper standard for determining Whether t0 appoint counsel for
10

an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding

showing the

possibility of a valid claim that

defendant’s behalf.”

Workman, 144 Idaho

would

at

is

whether the petition alleges

require ﬁthher investigation

529, 164 P.3d at 809.

“[T]he

facts

on the

trial

court

should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate

means would be Willing t0 retain counsel t0 conduct a further investigation into the claims.”
Swader V.

State,

143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007).

Here, the district court thoroughly reviewed Arrats’s petition and found he did not
allege facts

showing the possibility of a valid claim: With respect

t0 Arrats’s claim that

he

acted in self—defense, the district court properly recognized that Arrats waived that defense

when he

entered his Alford plea. (R., p.19 (quoting State V. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 69,

106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005)).)
ineffective assistance

by

With respect

to Arrats’s claim that his counsel rendered

refusing to present evidence 0f self—defense, the district court

properly observed that Arrats failed to plead deﬁcient performance or prejudice because
his counsel never

had the opportunity

t0 present evidence

0f self—defense given Arrats’s

Alford plea and because the facts Arrats alleged showed self—defense “wasn’t available t0
Arrats in the ﬁrst place.”

(R.,

pp.20-21 (citing Strickland

687 (1984); ICJI 1517).) With respect

district court

Rule 35 motion and in denying his Rule 35

m

properly found those claims were barred because Arrats raised,

0r at least could have raised, those issues 0n direct appeal.

W,

Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

t0 Arrats’s claims that the district court erred in

failing to appoint Arrats’s counsel for his

motion, the

V.

144 Idaho 433, 439, 163 P.3d 222, 228

840, 850, 392 P.3d 18, 28 (Ct. App. 2017)).)

(Ct.

(R.,

pp.21-22 (citing

App. 2007); Grove

V. State,

161 Idaho

With respect t0 Arrats’s claim that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel in his appeal

11

from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, the

properly observed that “appellate counsel

district court

are reasonably considered t0 be meritless

999

‘is

not required to raise issues which

(R., p.23 (quoting

280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015»), and properly found

wanted

his appellate counsel t0 raise

allege facts

discretion

showing the

When

On

it

possibility

were meritless

Dunlap

all

(R., p.23).

of a valid claim, the

V. State,

159 Idaho

of the issues that Arrats

Because Arrats did not

district court

did not abuse

its

dismissed Arrats’s petition Without appointing counsel.

appeal, Arrats does not directly challenge the district court’s conclusions as to

the Viability 0f his asserted post-conviction claims.

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief.)

For example,

Arrats does not argue that he did allege facts that supported a claim 0f self—defense or cite

any authority for the proposition
this case.

that self—defense could justify robbery in the context

(E Appellant’s brief.)

of

Instead, Arrats lodges several indirect attacks against

the district court’s decision t0 dismiss his petition Without appointing counsel. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.8-1 1.)

First,

None of the

attacks withstand scrutiny.

Arrats claims that the district court erroneously applied the standard

applicable to deciding the merits of a post-conviction petition rather than the standard
applicable to deciding whether to appoint counsel.

incorrect.

The

district court’s notice

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

That

is

of intent t0 dismiss expressly stated the correct

standard: “Post-conviction counsel generally should be appointed if the petitioner alleges

facts that raise the possibility

of a valid claim.”

Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)).)
that “Arrats has not

done

so.” (R., p.24.)

The

(R.,

p.24 (citing Charboneau

And

140

the district court speciﬁcally found

district court

allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim.

12

V. State,

then gave Arrats thirty days t0

(R., p.24.)

After Arrats ﬁled his

reply, the district court

found he had failed to raise the possibility 0f a valid claim “for the

reasons articulated in the notice of intent t0 dismiss.” (R., p.33.)

Second, Arrats asserts that “[t]he

district court’s notice includes

a technical analysis

0f the legal insufﬁciency of Mr. Arrats’ post-conviction claims and failed to meaningfully
notify Mr.

Arrats—a pro

capable 0f remedying.”

se prisoner untrained in the

its

ﬂ

I.C. §

deﬁciencies that he was

But “a technical analysis of the

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

insufﬁciency 0f Mr. Arrats’ post—conviction claims”
statute calls for.

law—of

is

legal

exactly what the post-conviction

19-4906(a) (requiring the district court to “indicate t0 the parties

intention to dismiss the application and

its

reasons for doing so”). The district court’s

ten-page notice of intent t0 dismiss walked through each of Arrats’s claims and explained
the reasons

notice

was

Why the

district court

especially “technical.”

district court’s notice

pp.26-32);

was going

c_f.

to dismiss each claim,

(R., pp.16-25.)

makes n0 mention 0f any

DeRushe

V.

State,

and nothing about the

Indeed, Arrats’s pro se reply t0 the

difﬁculties understanding the notice.

(R.,

146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009)

(explaining that, if the petitioner believed the state did not articulate the grounds 0f

motion

its

to dismiss the petition with sufﬁcient particularity, “then [the petitioner] should

have raised that issue below”).
Furthermore, Arrats’s appellate counsel,

Who

is

trained in the law,

makes no

attempt t0 explain how, in her View, the district court should have articulated the problems

With Arrats’s petition differently or What exactly Arrats could not understand in the notice.

(m Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

Elsewhere in his

brief, Arrats suggests that the district court

should have notiﬁed Arrats that “his petition was deﬁcient because records of the
underlying proceeding were not included.”
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(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

But

that is not a

simpler or less “technical” explanation of the defects in Arrats’s petition;

The

explanation 0f the defects in Arrats’s petition.

that

he was missing

petition

on

critical portions

that basis.

it is

district court neither

an incorrect

notiﬁed Arrats

of the underlying proceeding nor dismissed Arrats’s

(R., pp.16-24, 33.)

Third, Arrats claims that the district court had t0 appoint counsel because transcripts

not in the record contained facts that “give rise t0 the possibility of a valid claim that Mr.
Arrats’ Alford plea

was not knowing and voluntary.”

pertinent question, however,

is

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

The

“Whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility

of a valid claim that would require further investigation 0n the defendant’s behalf.”

Workman, 144 Idaho

at 529,

164 P.3d

at

809 (emphasis added). In other words,

to obtain

appointed counsel, Arrats had t0 allege facts in his petition showing the possibility of a
valid claim.

He

“is

not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for

possible nonfrivolous claims,”
(2001), and he

is

Brown

certainly not entitled t0

for possible nonfrivolous claims,

(2018) (refusing to “saddle the

c_f.

V. State,

have the

Rome V.

[district]

135 Idaho 676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141
district court search outside

State,

164 Idaho 407,

of the record

_, 431 P.3d 242, 251

court with an inefﬁcient and onerous obligation to

scour the records of underlying 0r separate cases in an aimless search for information that

might be potentially relevant”); United States

V.

Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for trufﬂes buried in briefs.”).
Arrats has not pointed to any facts alleged in his petition to support a claim that he

did not enter a knowing and voluntary plea.

(m Appellant’s brief.)

As

the district court

observed, “Arrats present[ed] no reason to think his Alford plea wasn’t entered voluntarily

and understandingly.”

(R., p.

1

9.) In fact,

even

14

after the district court

made that observation

in

its

notice 0f intent to dismiss, Arrats did not state anything in his reply suggesting that

he did not enter a knowing,

intelligent,

and voluntary plea.

(R., pp.26-32.)

Fourth, Arrats claims that the district court had t0 appoint counsel because
transcripts not in the record contained facts that “give rise to the possibility that

Mr. Arrats

received ineffective assistance of counsel during the course of plea negotiations.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.) Here, again, Arrats’s attempt t0 rely on transcripts outside of the

record misunderstands the standard for appointing counsel in a post—conviction proceeding.

E

Workman, 144 Idaho

the petition alleges facts

investigation

at

529, 164 P.3d at 809 (stating the relevant question as “Whether

showing the possibility of a valid claim

on the defendant’s behalf” (emphasis added». And

failed t0 point to

any

would require

further

here, again, Arrats has

facts alleged in his petition t0 support a claim that his counsel

provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations.

Even

that

if the district court

had some obligation

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.8—1

to troll for possible post-conviction

claims in the transcripts of Arrats’s criminal proceeding—and

d0 not show What Arrats claims: “namely

that

1.)

it

did not—the transcripts

he pleaded guilty despite repeated

protestations of innocence because his attorney did not provide effective assistance.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.4)

The

transcript of the change-of—plea hearing

shows

maintained that he did not have the intent t0 commit a robbery (2/ 10/2017

4

that Arrats

Tr., p.20, Ls.4-

In his opening brief, Arrats requested that this Court judicially notice the transcripts from

The transcripts were not
and Arrats made n0 attempt t0

his underlying criminal proceeding. (Appellant’s brief, p.1 n.1,)

part of the record in the district court

make

(ﬂ

R., p.17 n.1,),

the transcripts part 0f the record in the district court

(ﬂ R., pp.4-1

1).

Accordingly,

m

Court can, and should, decide this appeal Without resorting to the transcripts.
Roman, 125 Idaho at 648 n.3, 873 P.2d at 902 n.3. Nevertheless, the state acknowledges
this

that this

may need the transcripts to understand the parties’ arguments related t0 the
and therefore does not object t0 this Court taking judicial notice of the

Court

transcripts
transcripts.
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10) but that he believed the state could prove intent at trial (2/10/2017 Tr., p.25, Ls. 14-18

(“They have

all

of the evidence and then some.”)) and wanted t0 take advantage of the plea

deal (2/10/2017 TL, p.23, L.21

[my attorney] did his
walked through

— p.24, L.2 (“This

his entire thought process

Tr., p.12,

through and decided

.

.

.

0n entering an

L.15 — p.18, L.22.)

that Arrats “seem[ed] very articulate

this

the best deal that I’m going t0 get, and

And thank God the prosecution

best.

under oath. (2/10/2017

is

agreed

m

And

.

.

.

.”)).

plea 0n the record and

the district court

and very well spoken” and “seem[ed]

What course of action

[he]

In fact, Arrats

would

to

commented

have thought

like to take.”

(2/10/2017

Tr., p.14, Ls.8-1 1.)

The

district court also

conﬁrmed

going 0n here in court” (2/10/2017
court

would

had no “trouble understanding what’s

T11, p.22, Ls.8-16); that

“treat [him] as guilty if [he] enter[ed] a plea

p.20, Ls.4-10);

(2/10/2017

that Arrats

and

that Arrats understood

T11, p.24, Ls.7-1 1), his right to

Arrats understood the district

under Alford” (2/10/2017

he was giving up his right to a jury

cross—examine witnesses (2/10/2017

Tr.,

trial

Tr., p.24,

Ls.12-15), his right to present evidence, including his right t0 assert defenses (2/10/2017

Tr., p.12, Ls.4-8, p.24,

Ls.16-19), and his right to testify {2/10/2017 Tr., p.24, L.20

conﬁrmed

— p.25,

that his “lawyer told [him] t0 [his] satisfaction about [his]

L.1).

Arrats also

rights

and potential defenses” (2/10/2017

Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20),

and Arrats had nothing but

praise for his attorney throughout the proceeding (2/10/2017 Tr., p.16, Ls. 14-16 (“I have a

very good attorney.

lawyer

is

My

attorney

is

very good”); 2/10/2017

very good”); 2/10/2017 TL, p.23, L.21 — p.24, L.2

my attorney.”)).
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(“I

T11, p.22,

Ls.17-20

(“My

have n0 complaints about

It

attorney,

was only after Arrats had entered an
and those concerns were resolved

imposed Arrats’s sentence.

m

plea that he raised concerns about his

t0 Arrats’s satisfaction before the district court

(3/3 1/2017 Tr., p.29, L.4

— p.41,

L.1

1;

4/7/2017

Tr., p.4,

and the

p.12, L. 1 8.) Arrats raised the concerns at the ﬁrst sentencing hearing,

L.4

district court

gave Arrats a week to speak With his attorney and think about his options. (3/3 1/2017
p.39, L.20

raised

—

p.40, L.12.)

came from

like you’re

A

week

going t0 get out of

it”

0f freaking jailhouse, freaking lawyers, [who were]

(4/7/2017 T11, p.8, Ls.5-21), but that after the ﬁrst

sentencing hearing his “attorney quickly
ha[d] written

down

T11,

Arrats candidly explained that the concerns he

later,

“talk[ing] with a lot

—

that [he] thought

[him]

let

know that

was going

all

these cool things that [he]

to help [him] is not going t0

wor

”

(4/7/2017 Tr., p.10, Ls. 12-17). Arrats repeatedly assured the district court that he wanted

t0

move forward t0

19.)

The

sentencing. (4/7/2017 Tr., p.5, L.6

actual sentencing took place one

about his counsel or his

These
place,

m1

transcripts,

d0 not show

plea.

Which the

— p.6,

L.8, p.9, Ls.5-14, p.10, Ls.12-

week later, and Arrats

(ﬂ 4/13/2017
district court

Tr., p.42,

did not raise any concerns

L.4 — p.69, L.16.)

had no obligation

that “a reasonable person with adequate

to

review in the ﬁrst

means would be

willing to

retain counsel to conduct a ﬁthher investigation into” the possibility that Arrats entered an

involuntary plea because his counsel provided ineffective assistance.

at

654, 152 P.3d at 15.

The

district court

SLder, 143 Idaho

properly denied Arrats’s motion t0 appoint

counsel and dismissed his petition.
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the dismissal 0f Arrats’s petition

for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2019.
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